1 ciently than others. An innovative series of papers by Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) and Trefler (1993 Trefler ( , 1995 followed Leontief's suggestion and introduced technological differences into the HOV model. Trefler (1993) shows that factor-augmenting technology can equate actual trade in factor services and the theoretically implied trade in factor services. Allowing for factor-augmenting technological differences implies that factor prices are equalized in terms of relative efficiency units. For example, if labor-augmenting technology is five times higher in the United States than in Mexico, workers in the U.S. will receive a wage that is five times greater than the wage paid to workers who are in Mexico and otherwise identical. Trefler presents evidence that there is a strong relationship between relative factor payments and relative factoraugmenting productivity.
In an earlier paper, Robert Tamura and we (Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2007) also show that these measures of factor-augmenting technology obtained from trade theory are related to total factor productivity. Theoretically, factor productivity implied by trade is similar to total factor productivity in the following sense: If factor productivity indicates that a unit of capital in the United States is twice as productive as a unit of capital in the Philippines, then the return to capital will be twice as high in the U.S. as in the Philippines. Similarly, for a given level of capital in the U.S. and the Philippines, if total factor productivity in the U.S. is twice as high as total factor productivity in the Philippines, then capital and labor's returns can be twice as high in the U.S. Therefore, total factor productivity has the same effect on the returns to capital and labor as factor productivity from the HOV model.
In that earlier paper, we examined the determinants of factor productivity across countries. We found that protection of private property rights is the single most important explanation of cross-country differences in factor productivity in 1997.
Democracy has little relationship with trade productivities once property rights are included in the analysis. Measures of geography other than distance to a large market are not important.
In this paper, we examine changes in the productivity of capital and labor over time and how they are related to a particular measure of financial integration.
We find that capital productivities around the world are more similar than labor productivities in 1982 and also show much more evidence of converging from 1982 to 1997. Measuring financial integration for a set of countries that includes many different levels of development of financial markets is difficult. We suggest black market exchange rates as a measure of financial integration. Overall, black market exchange rates deviate less from official exchange rates by 1995 than they did in 1980.
We find some evidence that this convergence of black market exchange rates to official rates has been associated with convergence of capital productivities.
In the next section, we summarize how the productivities of labor and capital are computed. We then summarize the data on black market exchange rates and examine the data for an association of changes in black market exchange rates and capital and labor productivities.
PRODUCTIVITIES OF LABOR AND CAPITAL
The productivities of labor and capital are those implied by international trade in goods given assumptions about technology and consumption of goods across countries.
HOV Theory and Productivity Differences
The details of the computation of labor and capital productivities are available elsewhere (Trefler 1993; Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 2007.) In this section, we outline how the productivities are computed.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory of trade can be used to generate measures of productivity based on a comparison of the measured factor content of trade and a 3 predicted factor content of trade. The basic analytical construct is a transformation of trade in goods into implicit trade of the factor services used to produce the goods.
The computations assume that countries have identical constant returns to scale production functions, markets are perfectly competitive, and the world is free from barriers that distort trade. This means that the measures of productivity reflect tariff and non-tariff barriers or inducements to trade. To rule out corner solutions in which there is no trade in some goods, the analysis assumes that endowments of factors across countries are distributed in such a way that there is an integrated world equilibrium with all countries producing some of all goods. The analysis proceeds by comparing the measured factor content of trade and a predicted factor content given the endowment of factor services in a country.
The measured factor content of trade is determined from actual trade in goods at a detailed level. A presumed common technology of an input-output matrix of coefficients for the United States is used to determine this measured factor content of trade.
The predicted factor content of trade is a function of factor availability, production and domestic consumption. In the baseline HOV model, there are no differences in how efficiently factors are used across countries and resources are fully employed. If people in all countries have identical and homothetic preferences, country i's expenditure is proportional to its share of world expenditure. The predicted factor content of trade is factor use in domestic production minus factor use in domestic consumption.
The measured factor content of trade need not equal the predicted factor content of trade. These differences are the basis of the numerous tests of whether the HOV model characterizes actual trade.
An alternative way of posing the issue is to ask what differences in technology or productivity are necessary for the measured and predicted factor content of trade to be the same, an innovation due to Trefler (1993.) The measured factor content of trade is the same as the measured content of trade based on the common technology above. Suppose that technology differences are factor augmenting and the same across industries in a country. Then the predicted factor content of trade by a country adjusted for differences in productivity involves the unknown productivities for each factor for each country. Equating the measured and predicted factor contents of trade provides a productivity matrix for all countries for all factors.
A normalization is necessary because the productivities can be determined independently for all but one country. 4 It is standard to normalize the productivities to one for the United States, which is natural given that the "common technology" is measured from United States input-output tables. Measuring the productivities by the average for all the countries is one obvious alternative normalization. For our purposes of measuring productivities over time, it is more informative to measure the productivities relative to the average for all countries rather than relative to the U.S.
If measured relative to the U.S., then productivity change in a country is measured relative to productivity change in the U.S. If measured relative to the average, then productivity change in a country is measured relative to productivity change in the average country.
Data
As is standard in most empirical trade research, the data used in this study are drawn from a variety of sources. Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) , we assume that the return to education for the first four years of schooling is 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent for the second four years and 6.8 percent for all years of education above the 8th year. As in Bils and Klenow (2000), we assume the return to experience is quadratic. Each country's share of world consumption is its share of absorption of goods and services in all countries. Table 1 shows the list of countries for which we have computed productivities. The countries are from quite different parts of the world, with quite different levels of incomes and associated development. 1982, 0.809; 1987, 0.788; 1992, 0.492; and 1997, 0 .523. While not as large as the decline in Table 2 , the decrease in the standard deviation still is substantial.
CAPITAL AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITIES Estimated Productivities
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The median labor productivity has declined, which means that labor productivity in the typical country has not increased as rapidly as it has in these countries on average.
At the same time, the median capital productivity has increased, approaching one by 1997. This is an interesting difference.
6 Steven Ongena suggested treating some additional high capital productivity countries as outliers.
We deleted high initial capital productivity countries in addition to Madagascar, namely Trinidad and Tobago, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With these additional observations deleted, the standard deviation of capital productivities decreases uniformly from 0.667 to 0.448. The estimated coefficients of autoregressions similar to those in Table 3 show less mean reversion for capital productivity, which is to be expected. (The autoregressive coefficient is 0.87).
Interestingly, the constant term in the regression for labor productivity is small relative to its mean with these four countries deleted.
The more general issue of the effects of natural resources and specialized production arrangements on these estimated productivities is an interesting question that we are examining in our continuing research. Standard convergence regressions also lead to the conclusion that capital productivity has converged and labor productivity has not. The constant term in the labor regression suggests that there is a very large downward trend in labor productivity, which is dubious at best given Figure 2 . 8 There definitely is a downward moment of the relatively low labor productivities, but this cannot translate into a downward trend because the productivities have a lower bound of zero.
7 Regressions for the logarithms of the productivities lead to the same conclusion concerning convergence of productivities. 8 We thank Jouko Vilmunen for pointing this out to us.
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There are, of course, lots of reasons to be dubious about these regressions for generating conclusions. labor and capital productivity. It is worthwhile recalling that the productivities are measured relative to the average in each year, so falling productivity does not mean that returns to labor and capital falls. Falling productivity in Figure 4 means that returns to labor and capital fell relative to the average. While not as bad as falling absolutely, falling behind hardly is attractive. More than a few countries also had falling labor productivity and rising capital productivity. Only two, Cyprus and Singapore, had rising labor productivity and falling capital productivity.
Perhaps a measure of financial market integration will be informative about the integration of capital markets, and possibly labor markets as well.
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
With such a disparate set of countries, it is not immediately obvious how to measure financial integration.
The best measure would be the set of prices of various risk factors in foreign markets. This has a solid theoretical basis and an unambiguous interpretation. Such measures based on markets for stocks and bonds are not likely to be very useful for our set of countries though. A country such as Vietnam for example is unlikely to have representative data from financial markets to permit reliable and comparable estimation of the prices of risk factors. The same statement can be made for many other countries in our set of data.
An alternative measure is the openness of domestic financial markets to foreigners. This is the path followed by Edison and Warnock (2003) . Examination of their data reveals though, that even this measure is not available for many markets, no doubt because some of our countries do not have organized exchanges with data available. Instead of going down this road, we examine the foreign exchange market as a plausible candidate for informative data.
We suggest that the black market premium is likely to be a useful measure of finan-cial integration. A black market is prima facie evidence of an imperfectly functioning market for foreign exchange. In addition, a black market for foreign exchange implicitly indicates that some transactions occur at more favorable exchange rates, which is itself an indication of likely favoritism in the allocation of preferential exchange rates and corruption in at least some cases. Finally, a black market in foreign exchange is likely to be associated with other policies that hinder the efficient operation of a country's economy and would be reflected in low productivities of labor and capital.
Data on Black Market Exchange Rate
The data on the black market exchange rate are from a compilation of black market premia by Gwartney and Lawson (2005) . These data primarily are from various issues of the MRI Bankers' Guide to Foreign Currency. In this source, the black market exchange rates are estimates for the parallel domestic market for foreign ex- supplement these data by data from other sources when necessary. Figure 5 shows the black market premia for 1980 and 1995. These dates are two years before the first and two years before the last measures of capital and labor productivities. To facilitate later analysis, the figures show gross premia in percent, which means that the "premium" is the black market exchange rate relative to the official exchange rate in percent. As a result, a gross premium of 100 percent means that the "black market exchange rate" is the same as the official exchange rate.
Preliminary Analysis of the Data
It is immediately obvious in Figure 4 that the frequency of black market exchange rates well above the official rate has decreased markedly over the fifteen years covered by the figure. Many countries had substantial black market premia in 1980 and not 12 many had much in the way of black market premia by 1995. This strikes us as prima facie evidence of greater effective financial integration among economies. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the black market premia in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 . It is clear that there is substantial movement toward black market gross premia close to 100 percent.
In one sense, the histograms are less revealing than they could be. Even in 1995, there are quite a few countries that have gross premia above 100, in fact 41 countries. Table 4 presents summary statistics on the black market premia for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. have lower labor productivity, although Haiti has higher labor productivity.
FINANCIAL AND REAL INTEGRATION
Does this pattern hold for subperiods? Figure 9 shows the changes in capital productivities and black market premia for the three subperiods. There are a few exceptions, but it still is true that increases in capital productivity are seldom associated with increases in the black market premium. Figure 10 shows a similar result for labor productivity. Table 5 presents the results of Chi-square tests of association between changes in black market premia and changes in labor and capital productivities. The changes in black market premia are divided into three classes: falling, unchanging and increasing.
No change is quite likely since some countries never have any deviation from official exchange rates. 11 The changes in productivities are divided into two classes: rising and falling. Because it is a test of association, these test results do not impose any constraints such as linearity. We interpret the p-values in Table 4 as providing some support for the importance of black market premia for productivity. Capital productivities around the world have tended to converge more than labor productivities from 1982 to 1997. This is so even though capital productivities were more similar than labor productivities in 1982.
Financial integration is a possible explanation for the convergence of capital productivities. Measuring financial integration for a set of countries that includes many different levels of development of financial markets is difficult. We suggest black market exchange rates as a measure of financial integration. Black market exchange rates deviate less from official exchange rates by 1995 than they did in 1980. We find some evidence that this convergence of black market exchange rates has been associated with convergence of capital productivities.
Feenstra, Robert. 2000 . "World Trade Flows: 1980 -1997 University of California at Davis, manuscript and CD. There are 79 countries for each of the years. By construction, the mean labor productivity and mean capital productivity for each year are one. The t-ratios of parameters are in parentheses. 
